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Abstract—Machine learning models have been found to be
susceptible to adversarial examples that are often indistinguish-
able from the original inputs. These adversarial examples are
created by applying adversarial perturbations to input samples,
which would cause them to be misclassified by the target
models. Attacks that search and apply the perturbations to
create adversarial examples are performed in both white-box
and black-box settings, depending on the information available
to the attacker about the target. For black-box attacks, the only
capability available to the attacker is the ability to query the
target with specially crafted inputs and observing the labels
returned by the model. Current black-box attacks either have
low success rates, requires a high number of queries, or produce
adversarial examples that are easily distinguishable from their
sources. In this paper, we present AdversarialPSO, a black-box
attack that uses fewer queries to create adversarial examples with
high success rates. AdversarialPSO is based on the evolutionary
search algorithm Particle Swarm Optimization, a population-
based gradient-free optimization algorithm. It is flexible in
balancing the number of queries submitted to the target vs
the quality of imperceptible adversarial examples. The attack
has been evaluated using the image classification benchmark
datasets CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Imagenet, achieving success
rates of 99.6%, 96.3%, and 82.0%, respectively, while submitting
substantially fewer queries than the state-of-the-art. We also
present a black-box method for isolating salient features used by
models when making classifications. This method, called Swarms
with Individual Search Spaces or SWISS, creates adversarial
examples by finding and modifying the most important features
in the input. The purpose of these two attacks is to help evaluate
the robustness of machine learning models and to encourage the
exploration of much-needed defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) is being used to solve a wide variety
of problems in many different domains, such as image clas-
sification [1], malware detection [2], speech recognition [3],
and medicine [4]. Despite state-of-the-art performances, DL
models have been shown to suffer from a general flaw that
makes them vulnerable to external attack. Adversaries can
cause models to misclassify inputs by applying small pertur-
bations to samples at test time [5]. These adversarial examples
have even been successfully demonstrated against real-world
black-box targets, where adversaries would perform remote
queries on the classifier to develop and test their attacks [6].
The possibility of such attacks poses a significant risk to any
ML application, especially in security-critical settings.
Existing attacks, both black-box and white-box, rely on
model gradients to craft adversarial examples [7] [8] [9].
This requires internal knowledge of target models, which
is available in a white-box attack but not a black-box one.
To overcome this requirement, black-box attacks first train
a surrogate model that approximates the target’s decision
boundary [6]. The surrogate is then used as a white-box model
on which adversarial examples are crafted. If the surrogate suf-
ficiently approximates the target, adversarial examples crafted
on the surrogate transfer to the black-box model, where they
are subsequently misclassified.
Existing approaches, however, are currently either inefficient
or ineffective. The most effective existing technique by Chen
et al. [10] requires hundreds of thousands of queries to the
model, which takes time and could be easily detected. On the
other hand, the black-box attack by Carlini and Wagner [7]
uses a reasonable number of queries but only succeeds to
produce an effective adversarial example between 5% and 33%
while requiring much more computational effort. Both of these
approaches rely on gradient-based optimization, which may be
prone to get stuck in local minima. Gradient-based optimiza-
tion is generally very effective in the white-box context, since
the adversary can explore the model at leisure. In the black-
box setting, however, the limited number of queries makes
these approaches harder to apply.
In this paper, we examine how an adversary could overcome
the limitations of gradient-based approaches to create a more
realistic and thus more dangerous attack. In particular, we
propose the use of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)—
a gradient-free optimization technique—to craft adversarial
examples. PSO maintains a population of candidate solutions
called particles. Each particle moves in the search space
seeking better solutions to the problem based on a fitness
function that we have designed for the problem of finding
adversarial examples.
In our attack, called AdversarialPSO, we specify that par-
ticles move by making small perturbations to the input image
that are virtually imperceptible to a human observer. PSO
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has been shown [11] to quickly converge on good (though
not globally optimal) solutions, making it very suitable for
finding adversarial examples in the black-box setting, as it
can identify sufficiently good examples with few queries.
We demonstrate that this approach does indeed make for
an effective algorithm by using three image classification
datasets—MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet—and showing
that PSO uses far fewer queries to the target model than prior
techniques to generate adversarial examples with high success
rates and small distances from the original images.
In practice, the adversary may be constrained to making
fewer queries or, alternatively, be able to make more queries
and want to improve the quality of the images further. To
address this need, we also explore a method that better enables
a trade-off between the number of queries and image quality.
This approach utilizes some aspects of PSO to determine the
location of the most prominent features used by the target
model when making a classification to find adversarial exam-
ples subsequently. Previous work depends on model gradients
to determine salient features. With this technique, however,
the adversary can determine the important features in a black-
box setting without the knowledge of model internals. We call
this attack Swarms With Individual Search Spaces or SWISS.
SWISS restricts the particles to specific regions of the search
space, where they perturb the whole area to determine how
much the model’s classification will be affected and isolate
the features responsible for the model’s incorrect predictions.
Since each step of localization focuses on improving progres-
sively smaller regions of the image, the quality of the image
gradually improves with more effort, leading to a natural trade-
off between the effort involved and the quality of the outputs.
Contributions. In summary, our contributions are:
• We present AdversarialPSO, a gradient-free black-box
attack with controllable trade-offs between the number
of queries and the quality of adversarial examples.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of the AdversarialPSO
attack on both low-dimensional and high-dimensional
datasets by empirically evaluating the attack on the
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet datasets. We show that
AdversarialPSO produces adversarial examples compa-
rable to the state-of-the-art but with significantly fewer
queries and much lower computational overhead.
• To isolate salient features in a black-box setting, we
present the SWISS attack, an iterative localization process
that operates on the same PSO infrastructure used by Ad-
versarialPSO. The SWISS attack provides an alternative
to creating black-box adversarial examples, the quality
of which could be controlled by trading quality for the
number of submitted queries.
II. RELATED WORK
In the following section, we include related work in both
white-box and black-box settings.
A. White-box Attacks
Szegedy et. al were the first to discuss the properties of
neural networks that make adversarial attacks possible [5].
They show that imperceptible non-random perturbations when
made to a test image can cause a DL model to misclassify the
image. The attack was demonstrated using box-constrained L-
BFGS that calculates the perturbations necessary to get an
image misclassified. The authors also discuss the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples from one model to another, even
when the models have different architectures or when they are
trained using different subsets of the training data.
An explanation to why DL models are susceptible to adver-
sarial examples was presented by Goodfellow et al. [8], who
argue that the linearity of neural networks is what leads to their
sensitivity to small and directed changes in the input. They
also present the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which
calculates the perturbations that transform inputs to adversarial
examples. FGSM determines the direction of the perturbations
according to the model gradients with respect to the input and
adds minuscule values in that direction. Kurakin et al. [12]
extend this approach by introducing an iterative variant of
FGSM that takes several smaller steps instead of one relatively
larger step. The authors also evaluate the persistence of both
FGSM and its iterative variant in the physical world. To do so,
they print out adversarial examples and classify the images by
feeding them to a model through a camera. They found that
adversarial attacks are possible even in the physical world.
Papernot et al. take a different approach to craft adver-
sarial examples [9]. Instead of taking multiple small steps,
they construct a saliency map that maintains relevant input
features with high impact on model outputs. They utilize the
saliency map to perturb specific features and create adversarial
examples. This approach allows the adversarial example to be
crafted towards a target label specified by the attacker. In a
later paper, Papernot et al. extended the techniques of both
Goodfellow et al. and Papernot et al. to launch black-box
attacks against remotely hosted targets [6]. As both attacks
require knowledge of model internals—information that is not
available in a black-box setting—the authors resort to a local
white-box surrogate that approximates the black-box target.
The surrogate is trained using the Jacobian-based Dataset
Augmentation method, which expands the training set used
to train the surrogate with data points that allow the surrogate
to closely approximate the target’s decision boundary.
Another approach was employed by Carlini and Wagner [7],
in which they formulate their attack as an optimization
problem. They generate adversarial examples by iteratively
performing minimizeD(x, x+δ) where D is either an L0, L2,
or L 8 norm. The attack finds the minimum distance required
to generate an adversarial example, similar to that presented
by Szegedy et al. [5]. This is performed by reducing a set of
all pixels in an image to a subset of pixels that are allowed
to be changed. The attack defeats the defensive distillation
approach of Papernot et al. [13].
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B. Black-box Attacks
In black-box attacks, the attackers have no knowledge of the
target’s internals and only have the ability to query the target
with inputs of their choosing. Target models are assumed to
return confidence scores with each classification, which are
then used in creating the inputs for subsequent queries. These
inputs are specially crafted to gradually lead the attackers to
generating samples that are misclassified by the model.
To launch black-box attacks, Chen et al. propose ZOO [10],
a method to estimate model gradients using only the model
inputs and the corresponding confidence scores provided by
the model. The approach uses a finite difference method that
evaluates image coordinates after adding a small perturbation
to estimate the direction of the gradient for each coordinate.
However, as examining each and every coordinate does require
a large number of evaluations, the authors propose the use
of stochastic coordinate descent and attack-space dimension
reduction to reduce the number of evaluations needed to
approximate the gradients. Small perturbations are added in the
direction of the gradient, which as shown in the FGSM attack,
is sufficient to procure an adversarial example from the input.
Although it can successfully create adversarial examples that
are indistinguishable from the inputs, the ZOO attack does
require a large number of queries to do so. The number of
queries submitted by the attack depends on the dimensionality
of the inputs, where it would increase with higher dimensions.
Requiring a large number of queries may not be practical
when launching real-world attacks as target models can easily
monitor query traffic and block access for sources that are
deemed suspicious.
By utilizing Differential Evolution (DE), Su et al. show
that some test samples can be misclassified by changing a
single pixel [14]. Similar to the PSO algorithm used in this
paper, DE is a population-based algorithm that maintains and
manipulates a set of candidate solutions until an acceptable
outcome is found. The objective of the one-pixel attack is to
better understand the geometry of the adversarial space and
the proximity of some adversarial examples to their respective
inputs. The attack does not achieve high success rates due to
the tight constraints used in the study.
Another population-based black-box attack is GenAttack
[15], which uses Genetic Algorithm (GA) to craft adversarial
examples. This attack iteratively performs the three genetic
functions selection, crossover, and mutation, where selection
extracts the most fit candidates in a population, crossover pro-
duces a child from two parents, and mutation encodes diversity
to the population by applying small random perturbations.
The authors propose two heuristics to reduce the number of
queries used by GenAttack, namely dimensionality reduction
and adaptive parameter scaling. As we show in Section IV,
the AdversarialPSO attack we are proposing can create better
or comparable adversarial examples than those created by
GenAttack, but by using fewer queries.
Limitations. Prior black-box attacks using gradient-based
optimization to craft adversarial examples fall short for several
reasons. First, gradients can get trapped in local minima, which
can make the attack fail. Using many queries enables the
adversary to learn enough about the model to avoid these min-
ima, but at great cost in querying time and stealth, as we see
with ZOO. Furthermore, calculating the gradient with respect
to the inputs through backpropagation is resource intensive
and time consuming. It requires specialized hardware such
as GPUs to craft adversarial examples in an acceptable time
frame. Finally, as previously mentioned, black-box attacks
using gradients calculated from a local model require the
intermediate step of training a surrogate, which adds to the
overhead of the attack but does not guarantee the successful
transfer of the adversarial example to the target model.
III. PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we provide an overview of the PSO al-
gorithm and describe how we use it to generate adversarial
examples against image classification models.
A. Conventional PSO
Kennedy and Eberhart first proposed PSO as a model to
simulate how flocks of birds forage for food [16]. It has
since been adapted to address a multitude of problems, such
as text feature selection [17], grid job scheduling [18], and
optimizing generation of electricity [19]. The algorithm works
by dispersing particles in a search space and moving them
until a solution is found. The search space is assumed to be
d-dimensional, where the position of each particle i is a d-
dimensional vector Xi = (xi,1, xi,2, xi,3, . . . , xi,d).The position
of each particle is updated according to a velocity vector
Vi where Vi = (vi,1, vi,2, vi,3, . . . , vi,d). In each time-step or
iteration, denoted as t the velocity vector is used to update the
particle’s next position, calculated as:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t+ 1) (1)
vi(t+ 1) = wvt + c1r1(pg − xi(t)) + c2r2(pi − xi(t)) (2)
Equation 2 contains three terms. The first term controls how
much influence the current velocity has when calculating the
next velocity and is constrained with the inertia weight w. The
second term is referred to as exploration, as it allows particles
to explore further regions in the search space in the direction of
the best position found by the swarm. The best position within
the swarm is denoted as pg and is weighted with the constant
c1. Additionally, the uniformly distributed random number r1
is calculated in each iteration to encode randomness in the
search process. Similarly, c2 and r2 are used to respectively
weight and randomize the exploitation portion of the search,
which is performed to explore regions in the vicinity of the
particle. The third term is referred to as exploitation, and it
is influenced by the best position found by each individual
particle, denoted as pi.
Early implementations of PSO assigned a fixed value to
w. Shi and Eberhart, however, found that linearly decreasing
inertia weight was found to improve PSO performance [11]. In
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this method, we define fixed values wstart and wend together
with a maximum number of iterations tmax. In each iteration,
w is calculated as following:
w = wend + (wstart − wend)(1− t
tmax
) (3)
Clerc and Kennedy further propose the use of a constriction
factor k to avoid premature convergence [20] . PSO implemen-
tations that use k often discard the inertia weight seen in Eq. 2
to produce the following:
vi(t+ 1) = k[vt + c1r1(pg − xi(t)) + c2r2(pi − xi(t))] (4)
To reap the benefits of both the inertia weight and the
constriction factor, Lu et. al propose utilizing both variables
when performing PSO [17], which can be done synchronously
and asynchronously as seen in Equation 5 and Equation 6,
respectively.
vi(t+1) = k[wvt+ c1r1(pg −xi(t))+ c2r2(pi−xi(t))] (5)

vi(t+ 1) = wvt + c1r1(pg − xi(t)) + c2r2(pi − xi(t))
if t < tmax2
vi(t+ 1) = k[vt + c1r1(pg − xi(t)) + c2r2(pi − xi(t))]
if t ≥ tmax2
(6)
For long running PSO processes with a large tmax, there is a
high chance the constriction factor portion of Equation 6 will
not be reached. Hence, using this method would be equivalent
to using Equation 2 to calculate v if the number of iterations
does not exceed tmax/2.
B. Adversarial PSO
Among the many applications for PSO, we show in this
paper that it can also be used to craft adversarial examples.
Shi and Eberhart [11] found that PSO is quick to converge on
a solution and scales well to large dimensions, at the cost of
slower convergence to global optima. This would make PSO
an excellent fit for finding adversarial examples in the black-
box setting, as it suggests that it can identify sufficiently good
examples with few queries.
To adapt PSO to the problem of creating adversarial exam-
ples, we define a fitness function that measures the change
in model output when perturbations are added to the input.
In both targeted and untargeted attacks, the fitness function
simply measures how much the model’s confidence in the
target label rises or drops, respectively. When performing
untargeted attacks, the fitness for each candidate solution is the
confidence drop in the original class predicted by the model.
In targeted attacks however, the fitness is the rise in confidence
in the desired class.
We introduce an MSE L2 penalty term to the fitness
function to encourage smaller perturbations when synthesizing
adversarial examples. Let the original image be x, the current
adversarial image be x′, and p0 and p1 be the model’s confi-
dence in predicting the label for x and x′, respectively. Then,
the fitness function we use to generate adversarial examples
is:
Fitness = |(p0 − p1)| − c
n
∥∥∥x− x′∥∥∥
2
, (7)
where c is a constant to weight the penalty term.
To further control the perturbations added to the input
image, we define an upper bound value B of maximum change
to limit the L∞ distance between the adversarial image and
the original image. L∞ measures the maximum change to
any of the coordinates, where L∞ = max(|x1 − x′1|, |x2 −
x′2|, . . . , |xd − x′d|). Essentially, we use the clip operator such
that x
′
= clip(xi + vi, xi − B, xi + B). Additionally, we
also apply box constraints to maintain valid image values
when adding perturbations. These constraints are applied to
Equation 1 to yield:
xi(t+ 1) = clip(clip(xi(t) + vi(t+ 1), xi −B, xi +B), 0, 1)
(8)
For each image, generation of adversarial examples occurs in
three steps: initialization, optimization, and reduction.
1) Initialization: Initialization of the swarm involves creat-
ing the particles and dispersing them across the search space.
Two hyperparameters control how the swarm is initialized:
the number of particles in the swarm P and the change rate
m, which determines how widely the particles are dispersed.
Each particle begins with the input image x, but with a random
subset of their coordinates perturbed. The change rate specifies
how many of the total coordinates are perturbed and, as such,
controls how dispersed the particles are across the search
space. Although a highly dispersed swarm would have more
coverage, scattering the particles far from the original image
would result in adversarial examples that are quite distant from
the input. Once the particles are created and dispersed, their
fitness is calculated and subsequently used in the optimization
step of PSO. The algorithm for the initialization step is shown
in Algorithm 1.
2) Optimization: The optimization step of AdversarialPSO
is an iterative process that moves the particles in search for
better fitness. Particle positions are updated using the velocity
vector, which is calculated for each particle in every iteration.
Although traditionally the velocity vector is used to calculate
both the direction and the step size, in our implementation, we
only use it to determine the direction in which the particles are
moved along each dimension. In each iteration, the step size
is multiplied by a randomly generated number from a uniform
distribution between 0.0 and 1.0 and is then added to the value
of the current coordinate in the direction produced by the
velocity. After moving the particles, their fitness is calculated
using Equation 7. The new particle fitness is compared against
the particle’s best fitness to determine which particle position
will be used to calculate future particle movements. At the
end of each iteration, the particle with the highest fitness is
compared against the best fitness achieved in the swarm as
a whole (i.e, best swarm fitness), and if the particle fitness
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Algorithm 1 Initializing the swarm
1: Input: Input image x, penalty weight c, particle array par,
number of particles P , change rate m
2: d← length of x
3: indexes← select random d ∗m elements from x
4: bestF itness← 0 # swarm-wide best
5: bestPosition← x
6: for p← 0 to P − 1 do
7: par[p].position← x
8: for i ∈ indexes do
9: par[p].positioni ← par[p].positioni + 
10: end for
11: par[p].bestF it← calculateF itness(c)
12: par[p].bestPos← par[p].position
13: if par[p].bestF it > bestF itness then
14: bestF itness← par[p].bestF it
15: bestPosition← par[p].bestPos
16: end if
17: end for
18: return par, bestPosition, bestF itness
was found to be better, the swarm is updated to account
for the position with the highest fitness. The process is
repeated until the fitness threshold is reached or if the process
exhausts the allowed number of iterations. The algorithm for
the optimization step can be seen in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Optimization
1: Input: Input image x, maximum iterations tmax, max-
imum change B, penalty weight c, particle array par,
number of particles P , change rate m, stopping criteria
fitmax, swarm-wide bestF itness, and bestPosition
2: while t < tmax do
3: if bestF itness > fitmax then
4: return bestPosition
5: end if
6: for p← 0 to P do
7: v ← calculateV elocity
8: par[p].position← updatePosition(B)
9: fitness← calculateF itness(c)
10: if fitness > par[p].bestF itness then
11: par[p].bestF it← fitness
12: par[p].bestPos← par[p].position
13: end if
14: if par[p].bestF it > bestF itness then
15: bestF itness← par[p].bestF it
16: bestPosition← par[p].bestPos
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: return bestPosition
3) Reduction: This step reduces the distance between the
adversarial example generated by PSO and the original image.
Considering the different geometric distances between inputs
and their closest adversarial example, some images might
require more changes than others [21]. We have thus found
that setting the step-size to a small fixed value would in some
situations fail to find adversarial examples, or would do so only
after submitting a large number of queries. To successfully
generate adversarial examples from these images, larger step-
sizes must be used, which can result in overshooting the target
and thus adding unnecessary perturbations. To alleviate this
problem, we make two changes to the algorithm. First, rather
than starting with a large step-size, we commence the search
by adding small perturbations and only increase the step-size if
several iterations go by with no improvement to the best fitness
in the swarm. This is similar to the adaptive parameter scaling
method used in GenAttack [15], but instead of decreasing the
step-size, we increase it. Second, after successfully finding an
adversarial example, we remove all unnecessary perturbations
introduced by PSO. The reduction task is a simple iterative
operation that reduces the difference between the adversarial
image and input image by half until the label changes, at which
point it stops and takes one step back. The reduction process
does increase the total number of queries made by PSO, but
this can be easily controlled by limiting the number reduction
iterations. The algorithm for the reduction step can be seen in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Reducing excess perturbations from adversarial
image
1: Input: Input image x, Best position bp
2: for i← indices of perturbed coordinates do
3: if adversarial image label == target label then
4: diff ← (x[i]− bp[i]) ∗ 0.5
5: bp[i]← bp[i] + diff
6: else
7: undo last changes
8: return bp
9: end if
10: end for
11: return bp
4) Baseline, Center, and Random Mutation: In addition
to the PSO algorithm we use to generate adversarial exam-
ples, we implement three low cost operations that, in some
instances, improved the outcome of the search process. We
found that, by randomly designating one particle as what we
call a baseline particle, adversarial examples with low L2
distances can be found with little or no reduction. In essence,
the baseline particle is reverted back to the original input at
the beginning of each iteration from where it takes a single
step towards the swarm’s best position pg . If an adversarial
example exists within a single step distance towards pg , it can
be found using the baseline particle.
Another low-cost operation we found to be beneficial is
testing the fitness at the centroid of the swarm. Considering
the distance penalty applied to the fitness and the common
proximity of the centroid to the source image, testing the
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centroid can potentially yield better fitness than current particle
positions. Both the center and the baseline are calculated once
per iteration and as thus adds only one query each in every
iteration. However, they both have the potential to produce
adversarial examples with low L2 distances, which in turn
reduces the number of queries needed in the reduction phase.
Finally, we have adopted the mutation concept from genetic
algorithms to encode more randomness in particle move-
ments [22]. Although we set a low probability for mutation,
this nonetheless allows the exploration of regions in the search
space that would have otherwise gone unexplored. To mutate a
particle, we choose a random subset of coordinates according
to the change rate m and perturb those coordinates in a random
direction. After mutating a particle, we test the fitness at the
new location and update the swarm accordingly.
C. SWISS Attack
The purpose of the SWISS attack is to isolate the salient
features that influence a model’s outcome. The approach we
propose utilizes the PSO infrastructure to perturb different
regions of the search space and observe the change in model
predictions. To do so, we generate individual search spaces for
each particle, where each search space is a consecutive chunk
with a random length between one element of the search space
and (d/P )∗2 elements, where d is the number of dimensions
in the search space and P is the number particles in the swarm
(d is typically much larger than P ). The final particle is simply
assigned all remaining elements.
Using larger swarms in the SWISS attack would result in
smaller search spaces for each particle and as such, would
commence the search with higher precision. However, as some
inputs require more change than others to produce adversarial
examples, modifying small regions might not produce the
desired output right away and would require more effort,
especially in targeted attacks where a specific label is sought.
To overcome this, we apply a similar heuristic as the step-
size heuristic used in AdversarialPSO, where the step-size is
increased if no change is observed in several iterations. Rather
than increasing the step-size, however, we instead reduce the
number of particles to allow for larger search spaces for each
particle.
The idea behind the SWISS attack is to create a large region
(in L2 space) around the input and check if it contains adver-
sarial examples. The region is then iteratively made smaller
until it can longer be reduced. In the first iteration, the region is
expanded in every direction, where each particle is responsible
for expanding a subset of the dimensions and checking if
the expanded region contains an adversarial example. In the
next iteration, only the dimensions that contain adversarial
examples are retained and divided among the particles, where
the process is then repeated using the original input but
with only the retained coordinates. The localization process
is continued until no further localization is possible.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Setup
To evaluate both AdversarialPSO and SWISS, we consider
the following three metrics: the success rate (i.e., the ratio
of successfully generated adversarial examples over the total
number of samples), the average L2 distance between input
images and their adversarial counterparts, and the average
number of queries needed to generate adversarial examples.
We compare our results against the C&W attack [7], ZOO [10]
and GenAttack [15] using the three benchmark datasets
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet. For all three datasets, we
use the same models used to evaluate the three prior works [7],
[10], [15]; we refer the readers to Carlini and Wagner’s
paper [7] for more details. The results we report are obtained
from running both AdversarialPSO and SWISS on the first
1,000 correctly classified samples from the test sets of both
MNIST and CIFAR-10 for the untargeted attacks and the first
111 correctly classified samples for the targeted attacks, which
we evaluate by repeating the process for each target label.
In other words, we run both the AdversarialPSO and SWISS
attacks nine times for each sample, which brings the total
number of attack samples to 999 per dataset. Average attack
times are measured on a Lenovo ThinkPad Laptop with 24
GB RAM and an Intel Core i7-6600U 2.6 GHz CPU. The
attacks are executed sequentially by moving one particle at a
time with no parallel processing.
The parameters used for the CIFAR-10 dataset in the Adver-
sarialPSO attack are as following: 0.05 for step size, 0.05 for
the L∞ bound, 0.1 for the probability of random mutation,
2.0 for the exploration weight C1, 0.5 for the exploitation
weight C2, 0.05 for the change rate, 1.0 for the L2 distance
penalty, and 10 particles. For MNIST, the parameters are as
following: 0.5 for the step size, 0.5 for the L∞ bound, 0.3 for
the probability of random mutation, 2.0 for the exploration
weight C1, 2.0 for the exploitation weight C2, 0.3 for the
change rate, 1.0 for the L2 distance penalty, and 10 particles.
The value of the change rate parameter was chosen according
to the results of the hyper-parameter test we describe in section
IV-B, where we observe a negative effect with higher change
rates. Therefore, for both MNIST and CIFAR-10, a small
value was chosen according to their dimensionality to avoid
the negative impact of changing too many coordinates. For
the step-size and L∞ parameters, we simply chose a small
value as was discussed in section III-B3, to apply the step-
size heuristic for samples that require larger changes without
affecting samples that do not require as much change. The
values of the remaining parameters were arbitrarily chosen.
For the AdversarialPSO attack, if there is no improvement
to the fitness for five consecutive iterations, we double the
step-size and L∞ bound. We do this to take advantage of the
low query count of small swarms while maintaining a high
effective rate and low L2 distance. Although this only occurs
for a subset of the test samples, we believe it is necessary
to accommodate samples with adversarial counterparts that
are further away in the search space. The downside of using
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(a)
Label: Deer Label: Cat Label: Truck Label: 3 Label: 9 Label: 6
(b)
Label: Horse Label: Ship Label: Cat Label: 5 Label: 5 Label: 4
(c)
Label: Horse Label: Ship Label: Cat Label: 5 Label: 5 Label: 4
Fig. 1. Untargeted AdversarialPSO attacks on CIFAR-10 and MNIST : a) Before AdversarialPSO (b) After AdversarialPSO but before reduction (c) After
reduction
this heuristic is the added queries in the reduction phase
to minimize the unnecessary perturbations introduced when
taking larger steps. Essentially, this heuristic favors low L0
counts with high L∞ over high L0 and low L∞, while
maintaining balance for the L2 distance. The L0 metric
measures the number of pixels changed between the input and
adversarial examples. This translates to reaching a solution
quickly by making large steps towards fewer dimensions and
compensating for these steps in the reduction stage.
For SWISS attack evaluations that use more than 10
particles, if no improvement to fitness is reported in five
consecutive iterations, we reduce the number particles by
10% and we re-divide the search space among the particles.
This will assign a bigger chunk of the search space to each
particle in case the features needed to produce the adversarial
examples were located in different chunks. By using fewer
particles with larger individual search spaces, there is a higher
chance that salient features would reside in the same chunk
of search space. The minimum number of particles allowed in
this situation is two, which would split the search space in half.
In essence, running the localization from start to finish using
two particles is similar to a binary search of the search space
for adversarial examples. However, using just two particles
from the start is not recommended, as both chunks could
include important features, such that the localization loop will
repeatedly return both chunks. In both attacks, if there was no
improvement to the fitness for 20 consecutive iterations, we
terminate the search process.
B. Hyper-parameter Analysis
To assess the impact of different hyper-parameter values on
the two attacks, we perform empirical studies with varying
swarm sizes, change rates, and L∞ bounds. To test the sen-
sitivity of AdversarialPSO to the change rate hyper-parameter
m, we fix the number of particles while modifying the change
rate. We also execute the attack with fixed-sized swarms on
varying change rates and L∞ bounds. We conduct this study
by randomly selecting 100 samples from the CIFAR-10 dataset
and launching the attack with the different parameter values.
These tests were performed without any heuristics and without
performing the reduction step, as discussed in Section III.
One advantage of using bigger swarms is the capabil-
ity of synthesizing adversarial examples with smaller L∞
constraints. This is a natural consequence of having more
particles that can evaluate an increasing number of different
perturbations. This property was observed when comparing
swarms of 10 and 100 particles, where 100 particle swarms
were able to achieve 83% effectiveness when setting the L∞
constraint to 0.075. The smaller swarm on the other hand,
was not as successful, as they were only able to achieve 63%
success rates even when the L∞ constraint was increased to
0.15. Using bigger swarms, however, does require submitting
more queries to evaluate the perturbations introduced by each
particle, which would be necessary for datasets with larger
dimensions.
We found the change rate to have a negative affect on the
overall effectiveness of the attack. This could be attributed to
the distance penalty applied to the fitness, which would hinder
particles from finding better fitness positions as the L2 distance
is increasingly being penalized when more coordinates are
being modified. Table I summarizes our findings in testing
the AdversarialPSO attack with different swarm sizes, change
rates, and L∞ bounds.
C. Observations
Considering that we only use the velocity vector to deter-
mine the direction of the perturbations, the distance between
a particle’s current position and either it’s best position or
the swarm’s best position will only have an affect if they are
large enough to affect the sign of the outcome. Otherwise,
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(a)
Label: Cat Label: Horse Label: Ship Label: 9 Label: 7 Label: 9
(b)
Label: Dog Label: Cat Label: Airplane Label: 4 Label: 9 Label: 5
(c)
Label: Dog Label: Cat Label: Airplane Label: 4 Label: 9 Label: 5
(d)
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Fig. 2. Untargeted SWISS attacks on CIFAR-10 and MNIST : a) Before SWISS (b) After 1st localization (c) After complete localization (d)After final
reduction
TABLE I
AFFECTS OF SWARM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF PARTICLES, CHANGE
RATE m, AND L∞ PARAMETERS ON ATTACK PERFORMANCE
Size m L∞ Effectiveness Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
10 0.1 0.15 63% 2.5697 215
10 0.25 0.15 50% 3.7732 218
10 0.5 0.15 55% 5.1105 185
10 0.75 0.15 51% 5.7069 189
10 1.0 0.15 43% 5.6551 166
50 0.1 0.15 90% 2.4196 912
100 0.1 0.15 96% 2.3964 1618
100 0.1 0.1 90% 1.7179 2184
100 0.1 0.075 83% 1.2961 2764
the C1 and C2 weights play a more significant role if the
distances towards the particle’s best and the swarm best are
somewhat similar in magnitude. To alleviate this imbalance,
where the distance towards the swarm best will have a higher
chance to be greater in earlier iterations and the distance
towards the particle best will be greater in later iterations, we
found that having dynamic C1 and C2 weights produce overall
better results. In other words, by starting the PSO search
with higher C2 weights that are reduced with every iteration
and C1 weights that start low and are increased with every
iteration, the swarm will have an overall better performance.
This was observed on the CIFAR-10 dataset, as is has higher
dimensionality than the MNIST dataset.
For the SWISS attack, setting the change rate, step size, and
L∞ bound to 1.0 produced the best results. The attack was
more successful in generating adversarial examples with fewer
queries when using fewer particles, which translates to larger
chunks of the search space being assigned to each particle.
This occurs, however, at the expense of larger L2 distances.
Essentially, each particle would expand the perturbed region
to the boundaries of the search space and then check for
adversarial examples. The region is then reduced in every
iteration until no additional reductions are possible without
losing the adversarial examples that were previously found.
Our initial reduction process would directly reduce all the
coordinates that were perturbed when creating the adversar-
ial example. However, we found that dropping the excess
coordinates first before reducing the distance decreased the
average number of queries by almost a third. We do that by
iterating through all the coordinates that were perturbed and
completely removing the part of the region due to perturbing
each coordinate in turn. We then evaluate the sample by
querying the model. If the label reverts back to the original
label, we simply reinstate the initial change, and otherwise,
we continue to the next coordinate.
D. Results
1) AdversarialPSO: As can be seen in Table II, the Ad-
versarialPSO attack is successful with just 593 and 1224
queries to generate untargeted adversarial examples on MNIST
and CIFAR-10, respectively. In contrast, C&W Blackbox re-
quires over 4,000 queries, while ZOO requires over 100,000
queries—fully two orders of magnitude more queries than
AdversarialPSO. In a real-world setting where the queries
could be easily monitored by MLaaS providers and other
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TABLE II
RESULTS COMPARISON: THE AVERAGE QUERIES FOR ZOO WERE CALCULATED BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS REPORTED BY CHEN ET
AL. [10] TIMES THE NUMBER OF GRADIENT EVALUATIONS PER ITERATION. FOR THE C&W BLACKBOX ATTACK, THE AVERAGE TIME IS THE TIME
REQUIRED TO TRAIN THE SURROGATE AND TO GENERATE THE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE. FURTHERMORE, THE NUMBER OF QUERIES FOR C&W IS THE
NUMBER OF QUERIES NEEDED TO TRAIN THE SURROGATE AND WAS CALCULATED BASED ON THE USING 150 IMAGES AND FIVE JACOBIAN
AUGMENTATION EPOCHS AS USED BY CHEN ET AL. IN THEIR EXPERIMENTS [10]
MNIST
Untargeted Targeted
Attack Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time Avg. Queries Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time Avg. Queries
ZOO 100% 1.49550 1.38 min 384,000 98.9% 1.987068 1.62 min 384,000
C&W Blackbox 33.3% 3.6111 6.92 min 4650 26.74% 5.272 6.96 mins 4650
AdversarialPSO 96.3% 4.1431 0.068 mins 593 72.57% 4.778 0.238 mins 1882
SWISS 100% 3.4298 0.087 mins 3043 19.41% 3.5916 0.345 mins 20026
CIFAR-10
Untargeted Targeted
Attack Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time Avg. Queries Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time Avg. Queries
ZOO 100% 0.19973 3.43 mins 128,000 96.8% 0.39879 3.95 mins 128,000
C&W Blackbox 25.3% 2.9708 8.28 mins 4650 5.3 % 5.7439 8.3 mins 4650
AdversarialPSO 99.6% 1.4140 0.139 mins 1224 71.97% 2.9250 0.6816 min 6512
SWISS 99.8% 2.3248 0.1264 mins 2457 31.93% 2.9972 1.623 mins 45308
remote hosts, submitting such a large number of queries would
be impractical. AdversarialPSO also runs much faster than
either attack in just seconds instead of minutes.
AdversarialPSO also offers very high success rates of 96.3%
and 99.6% on MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. This is
almost as good as the ZOO attack and much better than the
33.3% and 25% respectively achieved by the C&W Blackbox
attack. The average L2 distance between the inputs and the
adversarial examples is reasonable at 4.1 and 1.4, respectively.
These distances are higher than those generated by ZOO.
Examples of untargeted adversarial examples generated using
AdversarialPSO on CIFAR-10 and MNIST can be seen in Fig.
1, and we observe minimal visually recognizable differences
between the inputs and corresponding adversarial examples.
Notably, the visible changes do not seem suspicious and do not
show signs to suggest that the images have been manipulated
when seen on their own instead of compared to the originals.
Given this, we believe that the AdversarialPSO outputs are
sufficiently convincing at these L2 distances.
For targeted attacks, AdversarialPSO also requires much
fewer queries than ZOO at 1882 and 6512 for MNIST and
CIFAR-10, respectively, again compared to over 100,000 for
ZOO. AdversarialPSO is, however, less successful than ZOO
at finding these examples, with 72.57% success rate for
MNIST and 71.97% for CIFAR-10. The same parameters used
to launch the untargeted attacks, were used for targeted attacks.
However, we removed the early termination condition and
allowed the search process to run for a maximum of 300
iterations.
2) SWISS: The SWISS attack was also able to gener-
ate adversarial examples. By using 3 particles to perform
untargeted attacks, adversarial examples were generated by
perturbing large portions of the input to the boundaries of
the data manifold and then reducing. This, however, generally
required more queries than AdversarialPSO and would create
adversarial examples with higher L2 distances. MNIST was
the only exception with regards to L2 as SWISS, on average,
generated adversarial examples closer to their sources than
TABLE III
ADVERSARIALPSO PERFORMANCE ON IMAGENET
Attack Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
ZOO 88.9% 1.19916 1,280,000
AdversarialPSO 82.00% 3.8304 2833
SWISS 70.66% 4.9331 8429
AdverarialPSO. The average L2 increased with higher dimen-
sion datasets, However, this could be balanced by increasing
the number of particles, which would raise the precision of
the attack and create adversarial examples with lower L′2s,
but with more queries. Examples of images generated using
the SWISS attack can be seen in Fig. 2 and the progression
of the SWISS localization process from inputs to adversarial
examples can be seen in Fig. 3.
E. High-Dimensional Evaluation on Imagenet
To evaluate the performance of AdversarialPSO on high-
dimensional datasets, we launched the attack on InceptionV3
using the first 150 correctly classified test samples of the
Imagenet dataset. By only utilizing a single CPU core to
calculate particle movements, the attack did require more time
to find adversarial examples, where the average run-time per
sample was 5.1 minutes using a swarm of only 20 particles. As
shown in Table III, although the average L2 distance between
Imagenet samples and their adversarial counterparts is 3 times
larger than ZOO, the number of queries used to generate those
adversarial examples is approximately 450 times less. Fur-
thermore, the AdversarialPSO attack successfully generated
adversarial examples for 82% of the images. Examples of the
generated adversarial examples on the Imagenet dataset could
be seen in Fig. 4.
In comparison to the GenAttack, which is summarized
in Table IV, AdversarialPSO performed better in either the
number of queries, the quality of the adversarial images, or
in both. Results are obtained by running the authors code
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Fig. 3. Progression of SWISS attack localization from start to adversarial example: (a) Before SWISS attack (b) After 1st localization (c) After 2nd localization
(d) After 3rd localization (e) After 4th localization (f) After final reduction
TABLE IV
ADVERSARIALPSO AND GENATTACK COMPARISON
AdversarialPSO
Dataset Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
MNIST 96.3% 4.1431 593
CIFAR-10 99.6% 1.414 1224
Imagenet 82.00% 3.8304 2833
GenAttack
Dataset Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
MNIST 94.45% 5.1911 1801
CIFAR-10 98.09% 1.3651 1360
Imagenet 74.66% 4.5563 8590
with the recommended parameters.1 The only parameter we
modified in the maximum steps for Imagenet, where the
authors recommend 100,000 steps, we set it to 5,000. With
a population size of six, this configuration allows a maximum
of 30,000 queries. We did so to evaluate the attack with a
limited number of queries to create a more realistic setting.
Without this limit, the authors report 100% effectiveness with
an average of 11,081 queries and 7.8540 L2 distance. As the
attack is allowed to run for more steps, many of the adversarial
examples were created after submitting a high number of
queries and adding large perturbations to the input, which
explains the higher query count and larger L2 average.
On MNIST and Imagenet, AdversarialPSO generated better
quality adversarial examples using a third of the queries
used by GenAttack. On CIFAR-10, although the average
L2 produced by AdversarialPSO was 3% more than that
produced by GenAttack, the average number of queries used
by AdversarialPSO is 10% less.
F. Wide Applicability of AdversarialPSO and SWISS attacks
To test the applicability of the two attacks, we evaluate
their effectiveness on two additional models for each dataset.
For CIFAR-10, we evaluate the attacks on the CNN-Capsule
model trained with data augmentation as described by Sabour
et al. [23] and the ResNet model proposed by He et al. [24].
1https://github.com/nesl/adversarial genattack
These target models achieve a test set accuracy of 82.43%
and 85.71%, respectively. For MNIST, we train a Hierarchical
Recurrent Neural Network [25] with an accuracy of 98.46%
and a simple Multi-Layer Perceptron with 98.40% accuracy.
Table V summarizes the results of this test. As shown in the
table, both attacks successfully generated adversarial examples
on all target models, including the CNN-Capsule model, which
uses augmented samples in the training process. This shows
the wide applicability of the attacks on different models.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Potential Improvements
Our current implementation of the AdversarialPSO and
SWISS attacks execute sequentially, where particles are looped
through and moved one by one. This design choice was
made to evaluate the speed of the attacks with the least
amount of resources. A natural next step is to parallelize
the process by dividing the particles among multiple CPU or
GPU cores, allowing for faster execution of bigger swarms. It
would not, however, affect either the L2 difference between
the adversarial examples and their inputs nor the number of
queries submitted to the target if the swarm size remains
unchanged.
An extension to PSO is Multi-Swarm Optimization (MSO),
which uses multiple sub-swarms instead of a single swarm.
Using MSO with different starting points could help cover
more areas of the search space and eventually find better
adversarial examples. This, however, would add to the total
number of queries if each MSO swarm is the same size as the
PSO swarm. To avoid this, smaller sub-swarms can be used in
MSO so that the total number of particles remains unchanged.
Having multiple sub-swarms also allows the use of different
fitness functions or different swarm configurations. The sub-
swarms could apply different distance penalties, mutate par-
ticles more or mutate them less, have different step sizes, or
have different exploitation/exploration/inertia weights. Sharing
the same starting point but with different configurations could
allow better exploration of different regions of the search
space.
10
TABLE V
WIDE-APPLICABILITY RESULTS OF ADVERSARIALPSO AND SWISS
MNIST
HRNN MLP
Attack Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
AdversarialPSO 100.0% 2.4497 552 94.7% 3.1831 548
SWISS 100.0% 2.5136 3214 100.0% 3.2096 1984
CIFAR-10
CNN Capsule ResNet
Attack Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
AdversarialPSO 97.8% 1.3343 2052 100.0% 0.5774 1723
SWISS 98.9% 2.0051 3725 100.0% 1.8391 1792
B. Limitations of Gradient-Based Attacks
Launching gradient-based black-box attacks could be made
with or without using a local surrogate; both approaches
have their limitations. First and foremost, when using a local
surrogate that approximates the target, the success of the attack
depends on the precision and efficacy of several intermediary
steps that could affect the overall attack. The attacker must
have a tight approximation of the target trained locally, and
the adversarial examples must successfully transfer from the
surrogate to the remote target. As we have seen in Section
IV, the C&W attack, which is capable of generating high-
quality adversarial examples in a white-box setting, achieved
low success rates when training on a surrogate in a black-
box setting. This could be attributed to a poorly trained local
surrogate that produces adversarial examples incapable of
transferring to the remote target.
Alternatively, a gradient-based black-box attack could be
launched directly on the target by estimating the gradients
as was done by the ZOO attack. Although the attack does
generate high-quality adversarial examples, it requires a large
number of queries to do so. Submitting multitudes of queries
to the target is impractical in a real-world attack, as that would
easily be noticed by an operator that is monitoring the volume
of incoming queries.
Although gradient-based attacks have been proven to gen-
erate high-quality adversarial examples, we argue that they
are impractical in their current state when launching black-
box attacks. Gradient-based techniques are finely tuned to
eventually finding global optima, which simply requires more
queries to be successful. The PSO approach thus appears
to offer a better trade-off in this setting, where it more
quickly converges to high-quality but non-optimal examples.
Considering that a black-box scenario is a more likely setting,
particularly in security-sensitive settings, attacks must be able
to generate adversarial examples with a realistic number of
queries.
C. Adversarial Examples in the Malware Domain
While images are an interesting test case, evading detection
algorithms is a more clearly security-specific setting where
adversarial examples are important to understand. Adversari-
alPSO could be adapted to generate adversarial examples in
the malware domain, for example. By considering malware
as an n-dimensional discrete vector, where each element is
an API call used by the malware, this problem could be
treated as a combinatorial optimization problem, an area
where PSO has previously had success [26]. As many API
calls have alternatives that perform the same functionality,
those calls could be swapped for their alternatives without
changing the malware’s behavior. The challenge would be to
find those alternatives and adjust the necessary parameters.
Furthermore, the changes must be reflected in malware code
without breaking the malware functionality by introducing
syntax or run-time errors. This presents an interesting potential
application of AdversarialPSO or SWISS, as the adversary
may well be attempting to evade a black-box classifier that
carefully limits the number of querying attempts for security
reasons.
D. Large-Scale Adversarial Attacks
The AdversarialPSO attack we present in this paper provides
the opportunity for attackers to launch large-scale attacks on
remote targets that host models for high-dimensional datasets.
Due to the nature of the attack, it can be easily scaled not
only on a single machine by increasing particles, but across
multiple machines that share a common target. We anticipate
future attacks on machine learning models not to be launched
from a single source, but from multiple sources working in
conjunction. In a sense, this is similar to botnets, where a
large group of zombie bots are utilized for a single purpose.
The AdversarialPSO attack provides the foundation for such
attacks, where tens of thousands of particles can be launched
by multiple attackers. Note that PSO does not require a GPU
for efficient computation, making it more suitable for this
setting than gradient-based techniques, since the capabilities
of the bots are more likely to be limited.
As we have seen in our experiments, using bigger swarms
provides the capacity to generate adversarial examples with
shorter L2 distances. Therefore, by pooling resources together,
a group of attackers can launch more powerful attacks that can
generate adversarial examples that are increasingly harder to
distinguish from their respective inputs. Such an attack could
be scaled to accommodate inputs with higher dimensions and
produce adversarial examples on models that are currently
difficult to attack, such as those that are trained on 8K
resolution images.
Additionally, as the bot nodes would likely be located in
different geographical locations, monitoring incoming queries
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Fig. 4. Untargeted AdversarialPSO attacks on Imagenet : a) Before Adver-
sarialPSO (b) After AdversarialPSO but before reduction (c) After reduction
would be more difficult than if the attack is originating from
a single host. To complicate the attacks even further, decoy
queries could be launched to confuse the target as to which
entities are part of the attack. This could also be achieved by
controlling the rate of queries being submitted by any single
source, where queries are to be submitted in a certain order,
at different times, or in random bursts.
The SWISS attack also has the potential for a large-scale
distributed attack. This would be especially true for high-
dimensional datasets, where each entity participating in the
attack could be assigned a specific region of the input. On
8K images, which contain up to 100 million coordinates per
image, attacks would require a massive amount of resources if
performed by a single entity. However, by dividing the image
among multiple parties, where each party is responsible for a
certain region of the image, generating adversarial examples
would be feasible.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented two black-box attacks based on the
evolutionary search algorithm Particle Swarm Optimization.
The first attack adapts the traditional PSO algorithm to produce
adversarial examples from images. The second utilizes the
PSO infrastructure to launch a localization-based attack that
finds salient features used by the target model for classifica-
tion. Our experimental evaluations on the MNIST, CIFAR10,
and Imagenet datasets suggest that both attacks can effectively
generate adversarial examples in practical black-box settings
with a limited number of queries to the target model. The
purpose of these two attacks is to help evaluate security-critical
models against black-box attacks and to promote the search
for robust defenses.
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